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will prove the soundness of the Article.50 On the other hand, other
writers point out that Article 4 is simply a codification of existing
law and practices with additional clarification of many clouded areas.5 '
Another authority suggests that the safeguards for the few bad
transactions should not be permitted to clog the flow of the great
majority of good transactions.
5 2
This writer is inclined to believe that the Article would make a
useful contribution to the banking law of Virginia. Although § 4-1o3
tends to favor the banks and would be more equitable in a compro-
mise between the earlier draftsm and the present one, the inequity is
not such as to make the whole Article objectionable. Since the banks
could continue to operate in most areas under the regulations that
they now follow, it would seem that they certainly should not object to
the adoption of the Article; in fact, they should welcome it. In light
of the fact that there is now a paucity of banking law in Virginia, it
is submitted that the adoption of Article 4 would be beneficial to
all parties concerned. The binks and their customers would be able
to ascertain more readily their rights and obligations in a given situa-
tion, and their attorneys would be able to advise them with more
certainty as to the result of action or non-action contemplated or
taken.
LYMAN C. HARRELL, III
A COMPARISON OF UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
63(1) AND (4) AND VIRGINIA LAW
In 1942 after years of demand for simplification and moderniza-
tion of the common law rules of evidence, the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Code of Evidence was offered to the states. The ob-
jective of the Model Code was to revise instead of merely restate
the law.' Although the Code was generally approved by authorities on
the subject of evidence; it was not enacted by any state and was cited
as authority by only a few courts. The failure of the Model Code is
51Malcolm, supra note 3 at 265.
5A Symposium of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, supra note io at
81; see note io supra at 24.
-"Leary, supra note 3 at 569-7 o . For a good discussion of the effect of Article 4
in Kentucky, which has recently adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, see Brown,
Bank Deposits and Collections, 48 Ky. L.J. 232 (1960).
"See Brome, supra note 2 at 3o.
"See generally, Model Code of Evidence pp. vii-xvi (1942).
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attributed largely to its drastic departure from the common law rules
of evidence, especially in its hearsay provisions. 2 In 1948 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided that the
law of evidence was a proper field for uniform legislation and under-
took to draft a more conservative set of rules, placing special emphasis
upon acceptability and uniformity.3 The Conference approved 'the
Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953.4 The American Bar Association
approved the rules in the same year,5 and the American Law Institute
followed in 1954.6
Rule 63(1) and (4) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which
contains exceptions to the hearsay rule, will be compared with the
existing Virginia law so as to point out some of the changes adoption
of this rule would bring about.
7
Rule 63. Evidence of a statement which is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmis-
sible except: (i) A statement previously made by a person who
is present at the hearing and available for cross examination
with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided
the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while
testifying as a witness.
A majority of jurisdictions, including Virginia, do not follow this
rule, but hold that prior statements, whether consistent or incon-
sistent, are inadmissible as substantive evidence unless admissible
under one of the established hearsay exceptions.8 It is considered
immaterial that the declarant is now in court and available for cross-
examination. However, prior inconsistent statements are admissible for
the purpose of impeaching the witness,9 and prior consistent state-
2McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 Texas
L. Rev. 559 (1955)-
3See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 161-63
(953) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Rules of Evidence.]
'1d. at 1o3
378 A.B.A. Rep. 134 (1953).
uMcCormick, supra note 2 at 56o.
Tor more thorough discussions of all the Uniform Rules of Evidence per-
iaining to hearsay exceptions, see Symposium-Hearsay Evidence, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
207 (1961); Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
13 ('954).
8McCormick, Evidence § 39 ('954); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454 (1941)-
"Ibid.
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ments may be used to corroborate the testimony of a witness under
certain circumstances.1 0
The proposed rule would "let in the prior consistent or incon-
sistent statements of a witness as substantive evidence of the facts.""
This includes prior writings by the witness which under present Vir-
ginia law may be used only to refresh the recollection of the witness.
12
Rule 63(1) also admits "past recollections recorded" which are re-
pudiated by the party making them.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has asserted that hearsay
evidence is excluded for three reasons: (i) it lacks the sanction of
an oath; (2) it facilitates the use of perjured testimony; and, (3) it
lacks the test of cross-examination.'" The first reason appears to have
little, if any, validity when applied to hearsay statements because such
hearsay statements are inadmissible even if made under oath.' 4 Wig-
more says that "it is clear beyond doubt that the oath.., is merely an
incidental feature customarily accompanying crdss-examination, and
that cross-examination is the -essential and real test required by the
rule."' 5 The second reason does not apply because the proposed rule
requires the declarant to be present at the hearing. The third and ap-
parently principal reason for the hearsay rule, is adequately treated in
the provisions of Rule 63 (1). Professor McCormick, a leading authori-
ty in the field of evidence, observes that the admission of prior state-
ments as substantive evidence "is well justified, since prior statements
were nearer to the event than the present testimony is, and since the
opposing party is afforded the very safeguard that the hearsay rule is
intended to guarantee, namely, the right of cross-examination."' 6
Wigmore takes a similar view.
11
Under present Virginia law, if the prior inconsistent statement is
1 Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 493, 6 S.E.2d 760 (1940). For a dis-
cussion of the circumstances under which prior consistent statements may be used
to corroborate the testimony of witness, see 17 Va. L. Rev. 696 ( 193).
u'McCormick, supra note 2 at 562.
2-Fant v. Miller & Mayhew, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 187, 224 (1867).
UHines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 743, 117 S.E. 843, 847 (1923).
2AFor example, testimony given by a witness under oath in a former trial
is excluded as hearsay when offered in a subsequent trial if the witness is available.
Director Gen. v. Gordon, 134 Va. 381, 114 S.E. 668 (1922).
25 Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 at 7 (3 d ed. 194o).
"McCormick, supra note 2 at 562.
'-"[B]y hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-examination. There
is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis for his former statement. The
whole purpose of the Hearsay rule has been already satisfied. Hence, there is
nothing to prevent the tribunal from giving such testimonial credit to the extra-
judicial statement as it may seem to deserve." 3 Wigmore, Evidence § tos8 at 688
(3d ed. 1940).
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admitted to impeach the witness, the opposing party is entitled to an
instruction that the jury can consider the statement only for that
purpose and not as substantive evidence.' 8 Such a rule imposes upon
the jurors the psychologically impossible task of considering the
statement as it bears upon the credibility of the witness and then
dismissing it from their minds as evidence to prove the facts stated.
In reality, it is thought juries have long considered prior statements
as substantive evidence, as McCormick recognized when he asserted
that the proposed rule "avoids the empty ritual of instructing the
jury not to consider the statement as substantive evidence."'19
It should be noted that the Uniform Rules in another section pro-
vide a necessary limitation on the ease with which prior statements
gain admission into evidence. Rule 45 permits the trial judge to ex-
clude otherwise admissible evidence when he finds that its probative
value is outweighed by the risk of confusion, prejudice, waste of time
or surprise.20 The Commissioners seem correct when they say, refer-
ring to Rule 63(1), that "when sentiment is laid aside there is little




Rule 63. Evidence of a statement which is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible
except: (4) A statement (a).which the judge finds was made while
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the
statement narrates, describes or explains, or (b) which the
judge finds was made while the declarant was under the stress of
a nervous excitement caused by such perception, or (c) if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, de-
scribing or explaining an event or condition which the judge
finds was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had
been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was
clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement
of the action.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has long recognized
that extra-judicial 22 statements are admissible under an exception
nVa. Code Ann. § 8-292 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
9'McCornick, supra note 2 at 562.
"Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 45 (953).
2 Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 63 (1), comment (1953).
2Extrajudicial has been defined as "that which is done, given, or effected
outside the course of regular judicial proceedings; not founded upon, or un-
connected with, the action of a court of law ... " Black, Law Dictionary (4 th
ed. ig5i).
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to the hearsay rule as substantive evidence if the statement is a part
of what is called the res gestae.28 In determining whether the state-
ment is part of the res gestae the Virginia court has placed more
emphasis upon spontaneity than upon contemporaneity.
24 There-
fore, in this state, while a statement need not be contemporaneous
with the event it must be a spontaneous or an excited utterance.
2 5
The basis for the "spontaneous utterance" rule is said to be that "the
spontaneity of the utterance is the guaranty of its trustworthiness in
substitution of that provided by oath and cross-examination."2 6 One
test set forth to determine whether a declaration is part of the res
gestae is that it must have accompanied the fact or followed under
its immediate propulsion. The declaration must show no evidence or
reflection, deliberation or calculation and it must have been a
spontaneous, undesigned and illustrative incident or part of the
litigated act.2 7 Another test adopted by the Virginia court is whether
the. declaration was the facts speaking through the party or if the
party was talking about the facts.28
The Uniform Rules of Evidence treat contemporaneous state-
ments and excited utterances made after the event separately in
Rule 63(4)(a) and (b) respectively. Rule 63(4)(a) admits contem-
poraneous utterances, and so only requires the statement to be made
while the declarant is perceiving the event, thereby dispensing with
the requirement of an excited utterance. The contemporaneous state-
ment is worthy of credit for two reasons:
"Firit, it is in essence a declaration of a presently existing state
*of mind, for it is nothing more than an assertion of his present-
ly existing sense impressions. As such it has the quality of spon-
taneity... Second, since the statement is contemporaneous
with the event, it is made at the place of the event. Conse-
quently the event is open to perception by the senses of the
person to whom the declaration is made and by whom it is
usually reported on the witness stand. The witness is subject
23Scott v. Shelor, 6g Va..(28 Gratt.) 891 (1877). For a criticism of the term see
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1767 (3d ed. 194o); Payne, The Mysteries of Virginia's Res
Gestae Rule, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 17 (1961).
"Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 ('951); Ellis v. Va.
Ry. & Power Co., 132 Va. 24, 110 S.E. 382 (1922).
"Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 619, 1x S.E.2d 523 (1958).
"Chappell v. White, x82 Va. 625, 633, 29 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1944). In this case the
statements of a child as to the cause of an accident, which were made immediately.
after the accident, were held to be inadmissible, not because they were insufficiently
close in time to the event, but because they were expressions of an opinion and
not a statement of fact.
'Ellis v. Va. Ry. & Power Co., supra note 24.
3"Upton v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 654, 2 S.E.2d 337 (1939).
[Vol. XVIII
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to cross-examination concerning that event as well as the fact
and content of the utterance, so that the extra-judicial state-
ment does not depend solely upon the credit of the declarant." 29
It is submitted that Rule 63(4)(a) provides the guaranty of trust-
worthiness in substitution of that provided by oath and cross-exami-
nation which is the basis of the Virginia res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule.30
Rule 63 (4 )(b) admits excited utterances made after the event while
the declarant is under the stress of the nervous excitement caused by
the perception of the event. Although the Virginia court has not
used the literal language of this rule it seems to be in accord with
Virginia law. In Huffman v. Commonwealth31 the court points
out that "whether a statement is a part of the res gestae depends on
the circumstances of each case, and there is no fixed rule by which
it can be decided.... [This determination] rests within the sound
judicial discretion and judgment of the trial court."3 2 The pro-
posed rule also leaves the question of admissibility to the discretion of
the trial judge whose finding, by necessity, must depend upon the
circumstances of each case. In Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth 3 the
court, discussing the time lapse between the event and declaration,
asserted that "while the statement need not be coincident or con-
temporaneous with the occurrence of the event, it must be made at
such a time and under such circumstances as will exclude the pre-
sumption that it is the result of deliberation."3 4 It is clear that
neither the Virginia rule nor the proposed rule requires exact con-
temporaneity. Both have a common purpose, i.e., to admit reli-
able evidence but to exclude- fabricated stories that are the result
of deliberation. Thus, it seems that any difference between the two
rules is in the language and not in practical effect.
Rule 63(4)(c) is new and is said to represent a cerefully considered
middle ground between the liberal extreme proposed by the Model
2Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae,
31 Yale L.J. 229, 236 (1922).
3DSee note 26 supra.
31168 Va. 668, 19o S.E. 265 (1937). The question faced by the court was whether
the trial court had committed error by admitting statements disclosing the circum-
stances of the shooting which were made a very few minutes after the declarant had
been mortally wounded.
'Id. at 681, igo S.E. at 271.
"See note 25 supra. The court held a statement by the decedent which was
made some thirty minutes after an alleged fight with the defendant was not ad-
missible as a part of the res gestae.
3 'Id. at 622, 101 S.E.2d at 526.
ig6i]
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Code of Evidence35 and the attitude opposing liberalization of the
hearsay exceptions3 6 The Commissioners point out that it was in-
cluded on grounds of necessity to "let in narrative statements not
falling within the definition of (a) or (b), but still having substan-
tial basis for trustworthiness."3 7 Recognizing that unreliable evidence
should not be admitted regardless of the degree of necessity, it ap-
pears that both reliability and necessity are prerequisites to the
admission of evidence under this rule. This is shown by the following
Commissioners' comment:
"Clause (c) is drafted so as to indicate an attitude of reluctance
and require most careful scrutiny in admitting hearsay state-
ments under its provisions. The fact remains that there is a
vital need for a provision such as this to prevent miscarriage
of justice resulting from the arbitrary exclusion of evidence
which is worthy of consideration, when it is the best evidence
available. 'Unavailability' is carefully defined in Rule 62 so as to
give assurance against the planned or fraudulent absence of the
decarant."
38
It has been pointed out that clause (c) would serve as a safety valve
in those unusual situations in which there is an ad hoc assurance of
reliability.3 9 The greatest need for such a rule arises in cases involv-
ing claims for workmen's compensation or for accident insurance ben-
efits when such claims rest upon a mortal injury observed only by the
person injured.
4 0
Rule 63(1), as outlined in the first part of this discussion, does
not seem to fall under the objections to hearsay evidence as proposed
by the Virginia court. The rule provides that prior statements are
admissible only if the declarant is in court and then only if the evi-
dence would be admissible if the declarant were on the witness stand.
Such a safeguard insures a high degree of reliability and should re-
move this evidence from the classification of inadmissible hearsay.
It is further submitted that Rule 63(4) offers a needed clarification
and simplification of the law in this area. In particular, clauses (a) and
(b) treat contemporaneous statements and excited utterances sepa-
rately and at the same time provide the necessary guaranty of re-
3"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the de-
clarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and subject to cross-
examination." Model Code of Evidence rule 5o3 (1942).
mUniform Rules of Evidence rule 63 (4) (c), comment (1953).
vIbid.
3Ibid.
"Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 276 (1961).
'0McCormick, supra note 2 at 562.
